Defining Unreasonable Radius Clauses for
American Music Festivals
Trevor Lane*
ABSTRACT
Since 1969, the music festival remains a staple of American musical
culture, and in order to meet consumer demands, today’s music festival
promoters rely on radius clauses ancillary to the performance agreements
that they use with artists. These radius clauses limit artists’ ability to
perform at other music festivals and concerts within a specified temporal
and geographic radius of the contracted music festival. Beginning in 2010,
legal challenges have alleged that broadly defined radius clauses used by
music festival promoters violate Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
This Note contends that radius clauses which limit artists from performing
beyond the festival’s geographic market and fail to distinguish between
festivals and concert performances should be considered unreasonable
restraints of trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, because such
radius clauses restrict more competition than is necessary to protect the
festival promoter’s legitimate objectives.
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INTRODUCTION
The 1969 Woodstock Music and Arts Fair remains one of the most
pivotal moments in American music history. Since Woodstock, the
American music festival has transformed; today over eight hundred music
festivals occur annually in the United States, attracting approximately
thirty-two million festival-goers annually.1 But today’s music festivals are
not just composed of fans, artists, and good times; rather, large-scale
festival promoters, corporate sponsorships, and the subject of this Note—
radius clauses—are all essential to the American music festival.2
In order to put on a large music festival, promoters must make large,
up-front investments, taking great financial risks.3 In order to protect these
investments, festival promoters rely on radius clauses4 ancillary to the
performance agreements between promoters and artists.5 A radius clause
1. Ismini Tsakiris, The Rise and Unfortunate Fall of Music Festivals, GOODMUSICALLDAY,
https://vergecampus.com/2017/04/rise-fall-music-festivals/ [http://perma.cc/Y45U-KR2S]; For
Music Fans, the Summer Is All a Stage, NIELSEN (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/
insights/news/2015/for-music-fans-the-summer-is-all-a-stage.html [http://perma.cc/MTJ2-74QE].
2. See infra Part II.
3. See Katie Bain, How the Music Industry Uses a Pervasive Secret Weapon to Keep Bands from
Freely Touring, LA WEEKLY (Apr. 18, 2017), http://www.laweekly.com/music/how-music-festivalpromoters-use-radius-clauses-to-keep-bands-from-freely-touring-8140333 [http://perma.cc/NWY9K
R4Y]; Karen Gwee, Music Festivals and the Pursuit of Exclusivity, CONSEQUENCE OF SOUND (Sept.
15, 2016), https://consequenceofsound.net/2016/09/music-festivals-and-the-pursuit-of-exclusivity/
[http://perma.cc/NS77-H7PF].
4. See Bain, supra note 3; Gwee, supra note 3.
5. This Note uses the term “radius clause” to refer to the restrictive covenant included in
performance contracts between live music promoters and musical artists; these radius clauses are also
known as “exclusivity clauses” and “blackout dates.” Additionally, this Note uses “artist” to refer to
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is a type of restrictive covenant that prohibits an artist from performing, or
advertising for, another music festival or concert within a specified
temporal and geographic radius of the date and location of the music
festival.6 Radius clauses are not unique to music festivals; nearly all live
music promoters, including traditional concert promoters, regularly use
them to protect their investments as well.7
However, as music festivals have grown in popularity and scale, the
temporal and geographic restrictions specified in radius clauses have
drawn criticism from commentators and legal challenges from music
festival and concert promoters.8 Specifically, commentators and promoters
allege that radius clauses with overbroad temporal and geographic
restrictions unreasonably decrease the supply of live performance artists,
which causes reductions in the quality and quantity of both music festivals
and concert venues, in addition to raised prices for live music
performances—all, these commentators and promoters allege, in violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Section 1).9
Motivated to understand the validity of Section 1 claims against
radius clauses used by large music festival promoters, this Note explores
the nature of such radius clauses and the analysis that courts would likely
employ to determine whether radius clauses violate Section 1. Part I will
discuss radius clauses and their role in the live music industry. Part II will
provide both a historical and present-day background understanding of the
American music festival. Part III will cover Section 1, focusing on the rule
of reason analysis by examining two legal challenges to radius clauses
used by live music promoters. Finally, Part IV will argue that radius
clauses used by large music festival promoters unreasonably restrain trade
in violation of Section 1 when they specify geographical restrictions
beyond the festival’s relevant geographic market and fail to distinguish
between concert performances and music festivals.
I. RADIUS CLAUSES
Radius clauses are a specific type of ancillary restraint and are not
exclusive to the live music industry. More commonly, radius clauses
describe commercial lease agreements that prohibit retail tenants from
opening a branch store within a specified geographical area that would
any performance act that may be contracted to perform on stage at a music festival. “Artist” may
include, but is not limited to, individual musicians and bands of all sizes.
6. See, e.g., infra Figure 1.
7. See Dylan Muhlberg, Grateful Web Interview with Don Strasbury, GRATEFUL WEB (Feb. 7,
2017), http://www.gratefulweb.com/articles/grateful-web-interview-don-strasburg [http://perma.cc/G
2BG-HXLU].
8. See infra notes 26–32 and accompanying text.
9. See discussion infra Section III.B.2.
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compete directly with the original store.10 Landlords use radius clauses to
protect their investments, ensuring that the customer base of their property
is protected from competition.11 Radius clauses used in the live music
industry and in commercial lease agreements are “ancillary restraints”12
and can be considered specific types of “restrictive covenants.”13 Ancillary
restraints are not the main purpose of an agreement or contract, but are
perceived as “necessary to the protection of the covenantee in the carrying
out of [the agreement’s] main purpose.”14 Non-compete clauses in
employment agreements are another type of ancillary restraint.15
Employers rely on non-compete clauses to protect classified information
and customer relationships from competitors,16 and typically these
covenants prohibit the employee from competing with the employer for a
“specified period of time in a designated geographical area.”17
In the live music industry, typically when an artist enters into a
performance agreement, the artist additionally agrees to a radius clause
ancillary to their performance agreement.18 The radius clause prohibits the
artist from performing (and often from advertising for) another
performance for a specific time period within a designated geographical
radius.19 For example, a performance agreement for a music festival in
Chicago, Illinois, may include a radius clause that prohibits an artist from
performing and advertising for a different music festival or concert within
a 500-mile radius of Chicago for 120 days prior to and following the date
of the festival.20 Most music festival and concert promoters rely on radius
10. Jeremy A. Gogel, Antitrust Concerns with Respect to Music Festival Radius Clauses, 38
LINCOLN L. REV. 87, 88 (2011) (citing Alan M. Disciullo, Geographic and Product Markets for
Radius Clauses Under the Rule of Reason, 19 REAL EST. L.J. 121, 121 (1990)). Gogel’s article is a
useful source for understanding the history of restrictive covenants and how the growth of American
music festivals is burdening smaller artists and bands that sign contracts containing radius clauses in
order to perform at large, well-attended festivals.
11. See id. at 89.
12. The idea of an ancillary restraint first appears in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898).
13. See Gogel, supra note 10, at 88–93.
14. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 283.
15. See Gogel, supra note 10, at 89.
16. Id.
17. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 (1960).
18. See Bain, supra note 3; Gwee, supra note 3.
19. See id.
20. This example is from SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theatre Entertainment, LLC, No.
16-13311, 2017 WL 3616562, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017). React was a club, concert, and festival
promotion company. Since 2008, React organized large EDM (electronic dance music) concerts and
festivals in Chicago, Illinois, and used radius clauses in performance agreements with EDM artists;
these “radius clauses prohibited artists from playing anywhere up to within a 500 mile radius of the
location of React’s event for periods of 60, 90, or 120 days prior to and following the date of the
event.” For additional examples of radius clauses in music festival performance agreements, see Scott
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clauses to protect the large, up-front investments made to put on the
performances.21 The radius clauses secure exclusive access to artists for
the terms of the clause, shielding the promoter’s ticket sales or recoupment
of initial investment from competing promoters.22
Radius clauses used in the live music industry include enforcement
mechanisms. If an artist violates the terms of a radius clause by performing
at or advertising for another music festival or concert, the promoter may
reclaim a portion of the artist’s performance fee,23 prohibit the artist from
performing at the music festival or concert,24 or waive the radius clause,
allowing another promoter to contract the artist in exchange for a
percentage of the latter promoter’s profits.25
The restrictive terms of radius clauses that are used in the music
festival industry have been subject to legal challenges and social criticism.
For example, in 2010, the Illinois attorney general’s office investigated
Lollapalooza’s (a music festival held annually in Chicago) use of radius
clauses for antitrust violations.26 In 2011, Jeremy A. Gogel argued in a law
review article titled Antitrust Concerns with Respect to Music Festival
Radius Clauses that music festival radius clauses violate Section 1.27 In
2017, Eagle Theater Entertainment (a live music promoter) alleged in a
counterclaim against SFX React-Operating (another live music promoter)
that SFX’s use of radius clauses violated both Section 1 and the Michigan
Antitrust Reform Act.28 Finally, in 2018, Soul’d Out Productions29 (an
Oregon-based live music promoter) filed a complaint with the U.S. District

Hiller, Exclusive Dealings and Its Effects: The Impact of Large Music Festivals on Local Music
Venues, 45 REV. INDUS. ORG. 153, 170–71 (2014); Gwee, supra note 3.
21. See Bain, supra note 3; Gwee, supra note 3.
22. Gogel, supra note 10, at 104; see also Bain, supra note 3; Gwee, supra note 3; Muhlberg,
supra note 7.
23. See Bain, supra note 3.
24. Id.
25. E.g., SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *2 (React agreed to waive some artists’ radius clause
restriction so that the artists could perform for a different promoter in exchange for fifty percent of
that promoter’s profits.).
26. Steve Knopper, Attorney General Investigates Lollapalooza, ROLLING STONE (June 25,
2010, 7:45 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/attorney-general-investigates-lolla
palooza-233557/ [https://perma.cc/AS3U-H29L]. The 2010 restrictions in Lollapalooza’s radius
clauses prohibited artists from performing at competing music festivals or concerts that were located
within a 300-mile radius of the festival for 180 days before and 90 days after the music festival. Id.
27. See generally Gogel, supra note 10.
28. SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *1–2 (React’s radius clauses “prohibited artists from playing
anywhere up to within a 500 mile radius of the location of React’s event for periods of 60, 90, or 120
days prior to and following the date of the event.”).
29. See generally SOUL’D OUT MUSIC FESTIVAL, http://www.souldoutfestival.com [https://
perma.cc/HY3C-ZA4P].
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Court in Oregon against five defendants30 (all live music promoters)
alleging that the defendants’ use of radius clauses (see Figure 1 below) for
the 2018 Coachella Valley Music and Arts Festival (Coachella)31 in Indio,
California, violated Section 1 as well as Oregon and California antitrust
laws.32
Figure 1 – 2018 Radius Clause in Coachella’s Contracts33

The challenges and criticism described above allege that the radius
clauses used by music festival promoters have anticompetitive effects that
violate Section 1. Specifically, the radius clauses unreasonably restrain
and cause harm to (1) smaller or less well-known artists,34 (2) smallerscale music festival and concert promoters who are located within the

30. Second Amended Complaint at 2, Soul’d Out Prod., LLC v. Anschutz Entm’t Grp., Inc., No.
3:18-cv-00598-MO (D. Or. Oct. 25, 2018) [hereinafter Second Am. Compl.].
31. See generally COACHELLA, https://www.coachella.com [https://perma.cc/R7L6-KNBZ].
32. See generally Second Am. Compl., supra note 30.
33. Id. at 3 (from a “portion of an email received from AEG’s counsel”).
34. See Gogel, supra note 10, at 88.
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geographical area of a large music festival’s radius clause,35 and (3)
consumers.36
In order to fully understand how courts will likely examine legal
challenges to radius clauses, one must appreciate the history and
characteristics of today’s American music festival market.
II. THE AMERICAN MUSIC FESTIVAL AND LARGE-SCALE
CONCERT PROMOTERS
Although the American music festival has evolved substantially
since its inception, today’s music festivals share important characteristics
with their pioneering predecessors. And yet, with the surge of millennial
consumer demand comes corporate sponsorships and large-scale
promoters that, together, fuel intensifying radius clauses.37
For many, the American music festival narrative begins with the
1969 Woodstock Music and Art Fair (Woodstock).38 However, one of the
first large American music festivals to attract nationally known artists was
the three-day Newport Jazz Festival in 1954, which featured, among other
legendary artists, Ray Charles, John Coltrane, Miles Davis, and Duke
Ellington.39 And in 1967, two years before Woodstock, Jimi Hendrix set
his guitar ablaze while performing at the Monterey Pop Festival.40
Although Woodstock was not the first music festival, its mark on
American culture creates an important context for understanding today’s
music festivals.
In spite of its fame, Woodstock was not a complete success.
Woodstock’s promoters (Artie Kornfield, Michael Lang, John Roberts,
and Joel Rosenman) set out to create more than a music festival; they
wanted a “proper festival with arts and crafts, and a literal sense of youth
community.”41 Woodstock’s promoters originally anticipated no more
35. See SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theatre Entm’t, LLC, No. 16-13311, 2017 WL
3616562, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017); Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 4; Bain, supra
note 3.
36. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *9–10. See generally Second Am. Compl., supra note 30.
37. For an example of intensifying radius clauses compare Knopper, supra note 26 (explaining
that the 2010 restrictions in Lollapalooza’s radius clauses prohibited artists from performing at
competing music festivals or concerts for 180 days before and 90 days after the music festival within
a 300-mile radius) with supra Figure 1, which shows a radius clause that covers all of North America.
38. About, WOODSTOCK, www.woodstock.com/about [https://perma.cc/SRZ8-LKDP].
39. MARLEY BRANT, JOIN TOGETHER! FORTY YEARS OF THE ROCK FESTIVAL 3 (2008).
Additionally, the Newport Jazz festival inspired the Newport Folk Festival, which in 1959 introduced
“artists such as Bob Dylan and Joan Baez.” Id.
40. Ben Sisaro, Monterey Pop, the Festival That Sparked It All, Returns, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/arts/music/monterey-pop-festival-50th-anniversary.
html [https://perma.cc/U37H-46W7].
41. BRANT, supra note 39, at 60, 62. Michael Lang, at age seventy-four, is one of the promoters
of “Woodstock 50,” the fifty-year anniversary of the 1969 Woodstock. Ben Sisario, Woodstock
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than fifty thousand attendees;42 however, nearly four hundred thousand
arrived.43 Spending between $135,00044 and $180,00045 on talent,
Woodstock’s promoters charged attendees $7 for a day pass and $21 to
attend the festival for the whole weekend.46 The total production cost of
Woodstock “ran around $2 million,” and Woodstock’s promoters did not
profit or break even—in the words of promoter Artie Kornfield,
Woodstock was a “financial disaster.”47 Woodstock’s lack of financial
success set the stage for today’s music festival promoters’ justification for
using radius clauses: to protect initial investments.48
Despite the financial shortfalls of Woodstock, the American music
festival has grown into a large corporate industry. Today, over eight
hundred music festivals exist in the United States,49 attracting over thirtytwo million music fans annually.50 For the millennial generation, which
comprise nearly half of American music festival attendees,51 attending a
multi-day music festival is a “rite of passage.”52 And a profitable one at
that; for example, “Coachella’s 2017 revenues were record setting: the
festival was attended by 250,000 people and grossed $114.6 million.”53
Additionally, today’s music festivals are increasingly controlled by “large
scale promoters,” or “music industry corporations,” which control the
promotion of multiple music festivals and concerts.54 For example, largescale promoter Live Nation Entertainment controls Lollapalooza, Austin
City Limits, Electric Daisy Carnival, and Bonnaroo.55 Moreover, largeReturns Again on the Festival’s 50th Anniversary, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/01/09/arts/music/woodstock-50th-anniversary-festival.html?action=click&module=Featu
res&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/WKQ7-JFRR].
42. BRANT, supra note 39, at 63.
43. Sisaro, supra note 40.
44. Id.
45. BRANT, supra note 39, at 63.
46. Id. at 83. Although, at some point during the festival, the promoters decided to stop charging
for admission, letting anyone who wanted to attend. See WOODSTOCK (Warner Bros. 1970).
47. BRANT, supra note 39, at 82. In Michael Wadleigh’s 1970 Academy Award-winning
documentary film, Woodstock, Michael Lang is interviewed during the festival and asked if the festival
needs to make two million dollars to break even. Lang replies, “Well, if we are going to break even,
you know. [The] point is that it’s happened and its working, you know. That’s enough for now.”
WOODSTOCK, supra note 41.
48. See Bain, supra note 3; Gwee, supra note 3; Muhlberg, supra note 7.
49. Tsakiris, supra note 1.
50. For Music Fans, the Summer is All a Stage, supra note 1.
51. Id.
52. Tsakiris, supra note 1.
53. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 2.
54. See Pete Mason, The Commercialization of Music Festivals and the Rise of Super Concerts,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/petemason/thecommercializat
ion-of-_1_b_7873236.html [http://perma.cc/MVV3-AT5G]; see also Sisario, supra note 41.
55. See Ben Sisario, The Music Festival Business: Who Owns What, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/28/business/media/The-Music-Festival-Business-
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scale promoters have the ability and resources to engage in vertical
integration, controlling the land, talent, infrastructure, and festival
vending.56
Large-scale promoters have immense resources and thus the ability
to offer consumers more than their independent counterparts. Today’s
music festivals offer a plethora of artists spanning multiple music genres.57
For example, Coachella’s 2019 artist line-up features headlining artists in
the musical genres of rap (Childish Gambino), psychedelic alternative
(Tame Impala), and pop (Ariana Grande), in addition to featuring Latin
trap (Bad Bunny), country (Kasey Musgraves), K-pop (BLACK PINK),
EDM (Zedd), and DJ sets (Driis).58 And, in the spirit of Woodstock,
today’s music festivals offer consumers more than just music:
Festivals offer their customers a different experience from single
concerts. Many festivals try to provide a festival or carnival-like
vacation experience for their clients. These large festivals provide a
weekend’s worth of entertainment, beyond just music. Many festivals
have multiple stages, with music performed on each of the stages.
Many festivals have art installations. Festivals also try to ensure that
festival-goers get to enjoy a large selection of food and beverage
options from a diverse selection of restaurants, breweries, wineries,
food trucks, and other providers. This experience can be thought of
as a bundle of individual concerts to which the consumer purchases
access with so many performances the consumer cannot possibly see
them all, as well as the other experiences referenced herein.59

By offering consumers multiple artists across genres and a wide
selection of entertainment, today’s music festivals attract consumers with
unique characteristics.
Consumers of today’s music festivals are primarily millennials60 and
are willing to travel further and pay more for the music festival experience;
Who-Owns-What.html [https://perma.cc/UBZ2-E7WF] (providing other examples of large-scale
promoters, including AEG Live, which controls Coachella and Stagecoach, and SFX, which controls
Tomorrowworld, Electric Zoo, and Mysteryland, USA).
56. See Mason, supra note 54.
57. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 9. See generally BONNAROO MUSIC AND ARTS
FESTIVAL, https://www.bonnaroo.com/lineup/ [https://perma.cc/VG22-WY48]; COACHELLA, https://
www.coachella.com [https://perma.cc/R7L6-KNBZ]; LOLLAPALOOZA, https://www.lollapalooza.
com [https://perma.cc/WW5M-F6GW].
58. See COACHELLA, supra note 57; see also Marc Hogan & Michelle Kim, 6 Takeaways from
the 2019 Coachella Lineup, PITCHFORK (Jan. 3, 2019), https://pitchfork.com/thepitch/6-takeawaysfrom-the-2019-coachella-lineup/ [https://perma.cc/LL35-HJWC].
59. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 9–10. See generally BONNAROO MUSIC AND ARTS
FESTIVAL, supra note 57; COACHELLA, supra note 57; LOLLAPALOOZA, supra note 57.
60. In 2015, nearly half of all music musical festival attendees were between the ages of eighteen
and thirty-four (i.e., millennials). For Music Fans, the Summer Is All a Stage, supra note 1; Trips
Reddy, Six Factors Driving the Growth of Music Festivals, UMBEL (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.umbel.

1256

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:1247

these characteristics attract lucrative corporate sponsors.61 Multi-day
music festival admissions cost hundreds of dollars62 and the cost to camp
at the festival for the weekend is not included.63 Additionally, the cost of
traveling to music festivals must be considered. While the average
attendee of a traditional concert will travel forty-three miles (and ten
percent will travel over 100 miles),64 the average attendee of music
festivals will travel 903 miles.65 Moreover, tickets to multi-day music
festivals typically sell out within hours—before the artists to perform are
announced. For example, the 201766 and 201867 Coachella sold out of
festival passes within hours of going on sale—and before the lists of artists
to perform were announced.68 Given the demographics and spending
habits of music festival consumers, it is not surprising music festivals also
attract corporate sponsors. Attracted by the opportunity to reach a large
and captive audience for several days, corporate sponsors offer large-scale
promoters significant compensation.69
With corporate sponsorship and sold-out crowds that pay hundreds
and thousands of dollars to attend a multi-day music festival, large-scale
com/blog/entertainment/6-factors-driving-massive-growth-of-music-festivals/
[http://perma.cc/
TY25-8A6Q]. And in 2018, millennials are between the age of twenty-two and thirty-seven. Michael
Dimock, Defining Generations: Where Millennials End and Post-Millenials Begin, PEW RES. CTR.
(Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/01/defining-generations-where-mille
nnials-end-and-post-millennials-begin/ [https://perma.cc/GU6D-J6EC].
61. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
62. COACHELLA, https://www.coachella.com/passes [https://perma.cc/7MZC-9E94] (Admission
to Coachella’s 2019 festival is $429 for general admission and $999 for a VIP pass.).
63. Id. (Camping packages for Coachella’s 2019 festival range from $125 to $9,500.).
64. How Far Have Fans Traveled to See the Artists They Love?, TICKETMASTER (Oct. 20, 2015)
[hereinafter How Far Have Fans Traveled], https://blog.ticketmaster.com/concert-road-trips/
[https://perma.cc/Q7TX-F83E]; see also Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 10.
65. Megan Leonhardt, What It Really Costs to Attend Coachella, MONEY (Apr. 9, 2018, 1:37
PM), http://time.com/money/4294043/cost-of-coachella/ [https://perma.cc/4HYT-G8K5]; see also
Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 10.
66. Andy Hermann, Coachella Is Already Sold Out, LA WEEKLY (Jan. 4, 2017, 2:56 PM), https://
www.laweekly.com/music/coachella-is-already-sold-out-7784292 [https://perma.cc/PWB8-NUVC].
67. Ryan Castillo, Coachella 2018 Sells out Both Weekends in Record Time, DANCING
ASTRONAUT (Jan. 6, 2018), https://dancingastronaut.com/2018/01/coachella-2018-sells-weekends/
[https://perma.cc/48YW-BSBX].
68. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 16.
69. See Reddy, supra note 60.
Today, the popular festivals are able to sell out just hours after they start selling tickets.
Sponsors and advertisers are willing to spend millions of dollars to target what they know
is a truly captive audience, for a whole weekend. Music festival sponsorship spending has
been growing exponentially over the last couple of years. According to IEG, LLC, North
American-based companies spent more than $1.5 billion sponsoring music venues,
festivals and tours in 2014, a 4.4% increase from 2013. The biggest sponsor, beermanufacturer Anheuser-Busch, is partnered with 31% of U.S. music festivals followed by
Pepsico, Coca-Cola, Heineken and Red Bull.
Id.
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promoters are able to: (1) afford bigger, more popular artists; (2)
compensate these artists in exchange for agreeing to increasingly
restrictive radius clauses;70 (3) which attract sold out crowds;71 (4) that
attract lucrative corporate sponsorships;72 (5) which increases the largescale promoter’s ability to expand. Further, because large-scale promoters
control multiple festivals and concerts, a large-scale promoter may waive
their radius clauses, allowing an artist to perform without penalty at a
different festival or concert that the promoter also controls.73 This
pervasive cycle feeds the intensification of radius clauses, leading to more
legal challenges, and criticisms that radius clauses used by music festivals
violate Section 1.74 Advocates attempting to bring a successful Section 1
challenge to radius clauses used by large music festivals must be familiar
with how present-day courts analyze Section 1 claims; specifically,
advocates must be prepared to apply the live music industry to the rule of
reason analysis.
III. HOW COURTS ANALYZE RADIUS CLAUSES FOR SECTION ONE OF THE
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT CLAIMS
A. Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act
In 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed “to protect the public
from the failure[s] of the market . . . not against conduct which is
competitive . . . but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy
competition itself.”75 Under Section 1, every contract that restrains
interstate trade or commerce is deemed unlawful.76 And, in general,
American courts disfavor restraints on trade, like radius clauses, because
society values competition more than an ability to contract.77 Therefore, a
70. See Bain, supra note 3.
71. See Hermann, supra note 66; Castillo, supra note 67.
72. Id.
73. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 21–24; Bain, supra note 3.
74. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text.
75. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
76. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation,
or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both
said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
77. Richard A. Kaye, Cause of Action to Enforce Noncompetition Covenant in Employment
Contract, in 36 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 103, § 6 (2008), available at Westlaw 36 COA2d 103 (through
Mar. 2019) (citing Genzyme Corp. v. Bishop, 460 F. Supp. 2d. 939 (W.D. Wis. 2006)).
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strict reading of Section 1 would exact that any restrictive covenants—like
the radius clauses used by music festival promoters—are, on their face, a
violation of Section 1 because the temporal and geographical restrictions
specified in the radius clauses prohibit an artist from performing in several
states, restricting the supply of artists across those states. For example,
Lollapalooza music festival in Chicago, Illinois, used radius clauses that
prohibited artists from performing for up to 270 days within a 300-mile
radius of Chicago,78 preventing artists from performing at festivals and
concerts in Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and
Wisconsin.79
However, the intent of the Sherman Antitrust Act was to provide
guiding principles for facilitating competitive activities and leave room for
courts to determine the legality of particular conduct.80 Indeed, in the 1897
case United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, the Supreme Court
discussed the Sherman Antitrust Act, indicating that it may only prohibit
unreasonable restraints of trade.81
It is now with much amplification of argument urged that the statute,
in declaring illegal every combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, does not
78. Gwee, supra note 3.
79. Id.
80. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59–60 (1911). In discussing Section 1, the
Court wrote:
And as the contracts or acts embraced in the provision were not expressly defined, since
the enumeration addressed itself simply to classes of acts, those classes being broad enough
to embrace every conceivable contract or combination which could be made concerning
trade or commerce or the subjects of such commerce, and thus caused any act done by any
of the enumerated methods anywhere in the whole field of human activity to be illegal if
in restraint of trade, it inevitably follows that the provision necessarily called for the
exercise of judgment which required that some standard should be resorted to for the
purpose of determining whether the prohibition contained in the statute had or had not in
any given case been violated. Thus not specifying, but indubitably contemplating and
requiring a standard, it follows that it was intended that the standard of reason which had
been applied at the common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character
embraced by the statute was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining
whether, in a given case, a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against
which the statute provided.
Id. at 60. Additionally, the Supreme Court, since as early as 1871, has recognized legitimate objectives
for imposing restrictive covenants and began upholding such covenants when the restrictions did not
pose an oppressive burden and when reasonable grounds existed for imposing the restriction. Or.
Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. 64, 68 (1874) (holding that a non-compete contract is valid
when the public is not deprived of the restricted party’s industry, when the party restricted is not
prevented from pursuing their occupation, and when reasonable grounds of benefit exists to the other
party); see also Gogel, supra note 10, at 91.
81. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 327–28 (1897). And in
1911, the Court held the Sherman Antitrust Act only prohibits unreasonable restraints on trade.
Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 59–60.
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mean what the language used therein plainly imports, but that it only
means to declare illegal any such contract which is in unreasonable
restraint of trade . . . the common-law meaning of the term “contract
in restraint of trade” includes only such contracts as are in
unreasonable restraint of trade . . . .82

Today, in order to establish a Section 1 violation, three elements must
be met: (1) an agreement must exist (2) that affects interstate commerce
and (3) that unreasonably restrains trade.83 Therefore, radius clauses used
in the live music industry violate Section 1 when a court finds their
restraint on trade unreasonable.
Further, in 1918, in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, the
Court upheld a restraint on trade,84 and in doing so, provided guidance for
determining when a restraint is unreasonable. Delivering the opinion for
the Court, Justice Brandeis articulates one of the earliest formulations of
what is commonly referred to today as the “rule of reason” analysis:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.85

Therefore, according to Justice Brandeis, radius clauses used in the
live music industry will not violate Section 1 when they merely regulate,
“and perhaps thereby promote[] competition,” rather than “suppress or
even destroy competition.”86 But how will today’s courts analyze radius
clauses to determine if they are reasonable or unreasonable restraints on
trade?
Today, courts analyze Section 1 claims and, depending on the
circumstances of the case, determine the reasonableness of a restraint after
applying one of the following: a per se rule, a “quick-look” analysis, or a
rule of reason analysis.87 Generally, courts find that a restraint on trade is
a per se violation of Section 1 when the restraint has “such predictable and
82. Id.
83. SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theatre Entm’t, LLC, No. 16-13311, 2017 WL 3616562,
at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017) (citing White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d
495, 504 (6th Cir. 1983)).
84. See generally Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
85. Id. at 238.
86. Id.
87. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7–11.
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pernicious anticompetitive effects and such limited potential for
procompetitive benefit”88 that the restraint “would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output,”89 and when the
court can predict—with confidence—that a rule of reason analysis would
condemn the restraint as unreasonable90 (e.g., when a court previously
reviewed the same restraint using a rule of reason analysis and found that
the restraint unreasonably suppressed competition91). Overall, a court need
not engage in an elaborate industry analysis to demonstrate the restraint’s
anticompetitive character when it finds a restraint per se unreasonable.92
Therefore, it is unlikely that a court, in the near future, will find a
promoter’s radius clauses per se unreasonable (1) because justifications,
or procompetitive benefits, exist for using radius clauses (i.e., to protect
large, up-front investments made by promoters);93 and (2) because a court
has not yet reviewed, and found illegal, radius clauses using a rule of
reason analysis.94
Similar to the per se rule, a quick-look analysis does not require an
elaborate industry analysis; however, a court will take a “quick-look” at
the defendant’s procompetitive justification before finding a restraint
unreasonable.95 Indeed, a quick-look analysis is appropriate when “an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive
88. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); see also SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *6.
89. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 906 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984) (“Per se rules are invoked
when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render
unjustified further examination of the challenged conduct.”); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940); SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *6.
90. See Khan, 522 U.S. at 10; see also SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *6.
91. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *6 (citing In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 271
(6th Cir. 2014)).
92. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (drawing a
distinction between restraints that are per se illegal and restraints requiring a rule of reason analysis,
the Court finds that “agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that
no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality” are illegal per se).
93. See Motion to Dismiss at 26–27, Soul’d Out Prods., LLC v. Anschutz Entm’t Grp., Inc., No.
3:18-cv-00598-MO (D. Or. June 25, 2018) [herienafter Mot. Dismiss]; Bain, supra note 3; Gwee,
supra note 3; Muhlberg, supra note 7.
94. Indeed, only two claims have been brought before a court alleging that a live music
promoter’s use of a radius clause is a violation of Section 1: in one case, the court held “that Defendants
have not alleged facts that would place this case into one of the limited categories that have been
collectively deemed per se anticompetitive,” SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7 (engaging, on a motion
for summary judgment, a rule of reason to analyze the radius clauses used by a music promoter and
finding that the plaintiff established a prima facie antitrust case; however, the motion to dismiss was
granted on successor liability and bankruptcy reorganization grounds), and in the other, the plaintiff
did not allege a per se violation, Second Am. Compl., supra note 30 (this case is currently in the
pleading stage).
95. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7.
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effect on customers and markets.”96 But when the defendant’s justification
for a restraint is “not easily rejected” by the court, the court will not find
the restraint unreasonable under a quick-look analysis, but will proceed to
the more elaborate rule of reason analysis.97 Like the per se rule above,
courts are unlikely to find radius clauses used in the live music industry
unreasonable under a quick-look analysis because live music promoters
can offer at least two justifications that are not easily rejected: (1) “to
protect attendance at [the promoter’s festival or concert] . . . from being
diminished by fans attending another performance of a featured artist
elsewhere around the same date” and location;98 and (2) “to protect [the
promoter] from competitors unfairly free-riding on its creative choices in
selecting its artist lineup and its investment in ensuring those artists will
come to” a specific geographical location at a specific time.99 Therefore,
it is likely that before a court determines whether radius clauses are
unreasonable restraints on trade—and, if so, under what circumstances—
it will apply a rule of reason analysis.100
Unlike the per se rule and the quick-look analysis, the rule of reason
analysis “utilizes a burden-shifting framework that allows the court to
‘analyze the history of the restraint and the restraint’s effect on
competition.’”101 This burden-shifting framework consists of three stages.
First, the “plaintiff has the initial burden to prove” the restraint on trade
96. Id. (citing examples first from Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S.
85, 99–100 (1984) (“[T]he league’s television plan expressly limited output . . . and fixed a minimum
price.”); then citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692 (“[T]he restraint was ‘an absolute
ban on competitive bidding.’”); and then citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (“[T]he restraint was ‘a horizontal agreement among the participating dentists to
withhold from their customers a particular service that they desire[d].’”)).
97. Id. (“[T]he procompetitive justification proffered by [defendant] . . . is not as easily rejected.
The Court next turns to the rule of reason analysis.”).
98. Id. at *2.
99. Mot. Dismiss, supra note 93, at 26–27.
100. Indeed, in SFX, this is exactly what the court determined. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562,
at *7. And interestingly, in the pending case against AEG’s use of radius clauses for the 2018
Coachella, plaintiff Soul’d Out alleged that AEG violated Section 1 under a quick-look analysis
because the radius clauses placed a “naked restraint” on the supply of artists, which limited output,
decreasing the quality of both music festivals and concerts within the scope of the radius. See Second
Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 35–36. However, Soul’d Out additionally alleged that AEG had no
justification that could offset the anticompetitive effects of its radius clauses. Id. But Soul’d Out’s
allegation will not likely be accepted by a court for the simple reason that AEG did offer a justification,
and AEG’s justification likely requires examination under a rule of reason analysis before its offsetting
potential can be credibly determined. For AEG’s justification, see supra note 99 and accompanying
text.
101. In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 271–72 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nat’l Hockey
League Players’ Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2003)); see
also SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7. Notice the similarity between the language employed in National
Hockey League Players’ Ass’n and Justice Brandeis’ articulation of the rule of reason in 1918. See
supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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“has a substantial anticompetitive effect that harms consumers in the
relevant” product and geographic market.102 Second, if the plaintiff meets
its burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the
restraint’s procompetitive effects sufficiently justify the anticompetitive
injuries of the restraint.103 And third, if the defendant provides a sufficient
justification, the plaintiff may prevail by showing that the defendant’s
legitimate objectives, achieved by the restraint on trade, can be similarly
achieved by less restrictive means.104 At bottom, a rule of reason analysis
should reveal whether radius clauses merely regulate and “promote
competition,” or whether they “suppress or even destroy competition.”105
As discussed above, it is unlikely that a court would apply a per se
rule or quick-look analysis to determine whether radius clauses used in the
live music industry unreasonably restrain competition; therefore, a court
will likely subject a Section 1 challenge of a music festival’s radius clause
to a rule of reason analysis. A court’s determination on whether a radius
clause is, on balance, unreasonable will likely hinge on the advocacy and
findings in three areas: (1) the definition of relevant product and
geographic markets, (2) the showing of anticompetitive effects, and (3) the
viability of promoter justifications. By examining two radius-clause cases,
102. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018); see also In re Se. Milk Antitrust
Litig., 739 F.3d at 272 (citing Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone Cty., 440 F.3d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 2006));
SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7.
103. In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d at 272 (citing Expert Masonry, 440 F.3d at 343);
see also Ohio, 138 S. Ct. at 2284; SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7.
104. In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d at 272 (citing Expert Masonry, 440 F.3d at 343);
see also Ohio, 138 S. Ct. at 2284; SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7. To illustrate how the rule of reason’s
burden shifting framework would be applied to a music festival’s radius clause, imagine the following
hypothetical: Bigfoot Music Festival (Bigfoot), located in Washington State, contracted with artists;
as part of these contracts, artists were prohibited from performing at any festival or concert anywhere
in Washington for ninety days before and after their performance at Bigfoot. The Soundbox is a
concert venue located in Washington. Imagine that Bigfoot is a wild success and contracts with many
popular artists, and further imagine that The Soundbox is struggling to attract popular artists to
perform. Therefore, The Soundbox files a Section 1 claim alleging Bigfoot’s radius clauses restrict the
supply of artists in the market for live music in Washington, and as a result, The Soundbox is no longer
able to obtain artists who are sufficiently popular to sustain business, thus harming consumers of live
music in Washington (because consumers now have one less venue to see live performances). If The
Soundbox demonstrates that Bigfoot’s radius clauses have a substantial anticompetitive effect that
harms consumers in the relevant product and geographic market, see supra note 102 and
accompanying text, the burden shifts to Bigfoot to demonstrate its justification for using radius
clauses. Bigfoot will argue that without radius clauses, The Soundbox—and every other festival and
concert venue in Washington—would take advantage of the fact that Bigfoot already invests for most
of the popular artists to travel to Washington because other festivals and concert venues will contract
those same artists to perform in the days immediately before and after Bigfoot, thus diminishing
consumer demand for Bigfoot. Unless The Soundbox can undermine Bigfoot’s justification or
demonstrate that a less restrictive alternative exists for Bigfoot to protect its initial investment,
Bigfoot’s radius clauses will not be considered a Section 1 violation.
105. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7 (citing Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560
U.S. 183, 203 n.10 (2010)) (internal citations omitted).
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SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theatre Entertainment, LLC (SFX)
and Soul’d Out Productions, LLC v. Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc.
(Soul’d Out), insights into how attorneys and courts are currently thinking
and analyzing these issues can be gained.
B. SFX and Soul’d Out
SFX and Soul’d Out are the only two examples of Section 1
challenges of radius clauses in the live music industry; as such, it is worth
summarizing the facts and issues of each case.
In SFX, SFX React-Operating LLC (React) was a music festival,
club, and concert promoter, and Eagle Theater Entertainment, LLC
(Eagle) was a similar live music promoter.106 As a counterclaim, Eagle
alleged that the radius clauses used by React, when React entered into
agreements with electronic dance music (EDM) artists to perform at
React’s EDM music festivals, were unreasonable and in violation of
Section 1.107 React specialized in promoting large EDM festivals and
concerts in Chicago108 and it used radius clauses in its agreements with
approximately one hundred EDM artists. These radius clauses prohibited
the EDM artists from playing anywhere within a 500-mile radius of
React’s events for periods of sixty, ninety, or 120 days prior to and
following the date of React’s events.109 The U.S. Eastern District Court in
Michigan applied a rule of reason analysis, finding that Eagle established
a prima facie Section 1 case before it granted React’s motion to dismiss
Eagle’s Section 1 antitrust counterclaim on successor liability and
bankruptcy reorganization grounds.110
While Soul’d Out is still in the pleading stages, Soul’d Out
Productions’111 second amended complaint112 builds a compelling case
and is therefore worth discussing. Soul’d Out Productions is a live music
promoter that promotes the annual Soul’d Out Music Festival.113 Soul’d
Out Music Festival is a “multi-venue live music event in Portland, Oregon
featuring a narrow set of genres, primarily those associated with ‘soul
music’ such as jazz, reggae, hip-hop, funk, and blues.”114

106. SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *1.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *2.
109. Id.
110. Id. at *11–12.
111. See generally SOUL’D OUT MUSIC FESTIVAL, supra note 29.
112. See generally Second Am. Compl., supra note 30.
113. See SOUL’D OUT MUSIC FESTIVAL, supra note 29.
114. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 12.
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In 2018, Soul’d Out Productions filed a complaint with the U.S.
District Court in Oregon against five defendants (AEG)115 (the large-scale
live music promoters responsible for promoting Coachella)116 alleging that
Coachella’s use of radius clauses (shown in Figure 1)117 violated
Section 1.118 Specifically, Soul’d Out Productions alleges that AEG, as the
second largest concert promoter in the United States, has the power to
remove artists from the concert promoter market in the Pacific Northwest
with its radius clauses that prohibit the performance and advertisement of
festivals, themed events, and concerts in North America.119 Soul’d Out
Productions alleges that Coachella’s radius clauses harm it and other
Pacific Northwest concert promoters, making them “unable to retain talent
from the limited pool of artists on tour in their geographic market during
the relevant season, driving up costs, and reducing the quality of their
offerings to the public.”120
The district court’s summary judgment analysis in SFX and the
pleadings from Soul’d Out provide useful context for explaining and
understanding the three most complex and likely contentious elements of
determining whether specific radius clauses are unreasonable restraints of
trade in violation of Section 1: defining relevant product and geographic
markets, showing anticompetitive effects, and promoter justifications.
1. Defining Relevant Product and Geographic Markets
As part of demonstrating a Section 1 violation, plaintiffs generally
must show that the defendant enjoyed market power in the relevant
product and geographic markets.121 Market power is normally inferred
when an entity possesses a substantial percentage of the relevant product
and geographic markets.122 The more broadly a product or geographic
market is defined, the more difficult it is to show that an entity possesses

115. See id. at 1.
116. Coachella Valley Music & Arts Festival, AEG, https://www.aegworldwide.com/divisions/
music/coachella-valley-music-arts-festival [https://perma.cc/PY9W-Z8XE].
117. See supra Figure 1.
118. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 38–67. Soul’d Out Productions also alleged that
Coachella’s use of radius clauses violated Oregon and California antitrust laws. Id.
119. See id. at 30–31. Soul’d out productions also alleges “Tying,” “Quick Look,” “Horizontal
Restraint Among Festivals,” a similar Section 1 claim alleging the “West Coast Market” in the
alternative, and “Hub and Spoke” theories of Section 1 antitrust claims. See id. at 32–38. However,
such theories are outside the focus of this Note.
120. Id. at 38.
121. See SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theatre Entm’t, LLC, No. 16-13311, 2017 WL
3616562, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017) (citing Found. for Interior Design Educ. Research v.
Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, 244 F.3d 521, 530–31 (6th Cir. 2001)).
122. See id. at *10 (citing Mfrs. Supply Co. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 688 F. Supp. 303, 307
(W.D. Mich. 1988)).
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market power.123 And without market power, an entity cannot have an
anticompetitive effect in violation of Section 1.124 Therefore, carefully
defined relevant product and geographic markets are critical to show a
Section 1 violation.
A relevant geographic market can be defined as the “area of effective
competition” in which the defendant competes.125 For example, the SFX
court considered the nature of the EDM concert industry, finding that since
concerts are a service industry, convenience is an important driver. Thus,
the court concluded that it can be reasonably inferred that most
concertgoers are from areas within Metro Detroit (the area in which both
React and Eagle promoted the festivals and concerts that were the subject
of Eagle’s Section 1 claims).126 While the radius clauses that React used
specified a 500-mile geographic radius, the court found the relative
geographic market to be Metro Detroit, a significantly smaller geographic
range, because Metro Detroit was the geographic range in which both
React and Eagle competed for concertgoers.127 In Soul’d Out, Soul’d Out
Productions alleges that the Pacific Northwest (i.e., Washington and
Oregon) is the relevant geographical market:
Ticket revenues from Soul’d Out Productions’ concerts establish that
hard-ticket concert consumers in Washington and Oregon are willing
to commute approximately 3–5 hours to see concerts—roughly the
distance from Seattle to Portland. Hard-tickets sold for the Soul’d Out
Music Festival’s individual concerts are mostly purchased from
customers throughout Washington and Oregon. TicketMaster’s study
showed that the average concert attendee travels 43 miles to see a

123. See, e.g., Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249–52 (1959)
(finding that the defendant’s market power would diminish as the relevant product market is broadened
to include more boxing matches).
124. Davis-Watkins Co. v. Serv. Merch., 686 F.2d 1190, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982).
125. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949). Justice
Frankfurter discussed in a footnote the purpose and methodology for defining relevant geographic
markets:
It is clear, of course, that the ‘line of commerce’ affected need not be nationwide, at least
where the purchasers cannot, as a practical matter, turn to suppliers outside their own area.
Although the effect on competition will be quantitatively the same if a given volume of the
industry’s business is assumed to be covered, whether or not the affected sources of supply
are those of the industry as a whole or only those of a particular region, a purely quantitative
measure of this effect is inadequate because the narrower the area of competition, the
greater the comparative effect on the area’s competitors. Since it is the preservation of
competition which is at stake, the significant proportion of coverage is that within the area
of effective competition.
Id.
126. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *10.
127. See id. at *10–11.
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concert, and 10% of buyers have traveled more than 100 miles to see
a show.128

Similar to SFX, Soul’d Out Productions alleges a geographic market
substantially smaller than the scope specified in Coachella’s radius
clauses, which cover California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and
Arizona.129 From SFX and Soul’d Out, it appears that relevant geographic
markets in the live music industry are defined by the average distance that
festivalgoers or concertgoers are willing to travel to attend the music
festival or concert.
A relevant product market exists when products have reasonable
interchangeability.130 Therefore, relevant product markets turn on the
availability of substitutes.131 And the availability of substitutes involves an
analysis of the cross-elasticity of market demand (e.g., as the prices of a
weekend music festival pass for festival X increases, festivalgoers will
readily switch to purchasing a similar pass to music festival Y).132
Moreover, different markets can exist with a distinction between products
in degree, as opposed to a distinction between products in kind; for
antitrust challenges, this distinction means that a submarket may be
considered a separate market.133 For example, in SFX, the court found that
“nationally recognized EDM artists” are a submarket with distinct
qualities because nationally recognized EDM artists require specific
venues, attract a specific crowd that seeks EDM music, and often work
with certain EDM promoters.134 Citing Nobody In Particular Presents,
Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., the SFX court compared
EDM concerts to rock concerts, asserting that rock concerts have a distinct
customer base, and non-rock concerts are not substitutes for rock
concertgoers.135

128. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 30 (citing How Far Have Fans Traveled, supra note
64).
129. See supra Figure 1.
130. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *9 (citing Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431
F.3d 917, 933 (6th Cir. 2005)); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 467
(1992); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2001)).
131. See id. (citing Nobody In Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 311 F.
Supp. 2d 1048, 1075 (D. Colo. 2004)).
132. Id.
133. In finding a submarket, boundaries do exist when: (1) the industry and public recognition
of the submarket as a separate economic entity exists and (2) when products with unique and distinct
uses, qualities, processes, price sensitivities, production facilities, consumers, and vendors exist. Id.
(citing Nobody In Particular Presents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1081).
134. See id. at 10–11.
135. Id. at 10 (citing Nobody In Particular Presents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1084).
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However, in Soul’d Out, Soul’d Out Productions distinguishes
between “the concert tour market” and “the concert festival market.”136
The concert tour market is comprised of the live performances that artists
book with concert venue promoters as part of their concert tour.137 Each
performance (or concert) features the artist, and ticket sales are directly
traceable to the artist (i.e., “hard-ticket sales”).138 Further, concert
promoters seek to enter into contracts with artists from any and all music
genres.139 However, the concert festival market is comprised of “large
open-air events hosted over a few days or weeks in a single outdoor
venue[, t]ypically, these large, outdoor festivals feature artists that span a
variety of music genres.”140 Outdoor festivals offer a consumer experience
different from single concerts.141 Customers will pay more and travel
greater distances to experience such festivals than they would for a single
concert.142 And, because these large music festivals often can sell out
before the artists to perform are announced, ticket sales are not traceable
to any single artist but, rather, to the music festival itself (i.e., “soft-ticket”
sales).143 According to Soul’d Out Productions, hard-ticket concerts do not
generally compete with soft-ticket festivals.144
Once the relevant product and geographic markets are defined, the
court can determine whether the defendant enjoys market power, which is
normally inferred when an entity possesses a substantial percentage of the
relevant markets.145 In SFX, once the court defined the relevant market as
nationally recognized EDM artists performing in Metro Detroit, the court
found that given the vast number of EDM artists who React contracts with
and given the scope of its radius clauses, React had substantial control of
the relevant market (finding that React controlled where and when
nationally recognized EDM artists could perform and whether it would
waive radius clauses).146 In Soul’d Out, Soul’d Out alleges that AEG, “the
second largest presenter of live music and entertainment events in the
world,” wields “substantial power in the music concert markets in the
136. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 8–11.
137. See id. at 8.
138. See id. at 8–9.
139. See id. at 9.
140. Id.
141. Id.; see also supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
142. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 10; see also supra notes 62–65 and
accompanying text.
143. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 10–11; see also supra notes 67–69 and
accompanying text.
144. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 11.
145. See SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theatre Entertainment, LLC, No. 16-13311, 2017
WL 3616562, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017) (citing Mfrs. Supply Co. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg.
Co., 688 F. Supp. 303, 307 (W.D. Mich. 1988)).
146. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *11.
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Pacific Northwest.”147 Primarily, AEG’s market power is attributed to its
ownership of many concert venues, its ownership of many music festivals,
its ability to operate a ticketing company, and its ability to be the exclusive
promoter for several artists.148
It is important to note that “market definition is a deeply factintensive inquiry,”149 requiring “inquiry into the commercial realities
faced by the consumers.”150 So while the market definitions and
subsequent market power findings in both SFX and Soul’d Out may seem
logical, a plaintiff would need to verify the existence of such markets
before either definition would be accepted by a court—a task easier said
than done.
Specific, relevant market definitions are not only essential to framing
market power analysis but are equally critical to show anticompetitive
effects.
2. Showing Anticompetitive Effects
Additionally, to demonstrate a Section 1 violation, the plaintiff must
also show that the restraint on trade had adverse or anticompetitive effects
in the relevant market.151
The court in SFX found it plausible that the radius clauses used by
React had anticompetitive effects in the market for nationally recognized
EDM artists in Metro Detroit.152 In SFX, Eagle argued that when React
contracted with hundreds of EDM artists, using radius clauses that
prohibited the artists from performing (and advertising for) festivals and
concerts within a 500-mile radius, those restrictions placed other concert
promoters in the 500-mile radius in an unfair position.153 Specifically,
other concert promoters were forced to either forgo contracting with many
EDM artists or they had to agree to React’s harsh co-promotion
agreements.154 Therefore, the effects of React’s radius clauses (1)

147. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 13.
148. Id. at 13–16; see also AEG, https://www.aegworldwide.com/divisions/music [https://perma
.cc/9DTT-GD33].
149. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2001).
150. SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *9.
151. Id. at 11 (quoting Care Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 427 F.3d 1008, 1014
(6th Cir. 2005) (“[B]ecause the Sherman Act was intended to protect competition and the market as a
whole, not individual competitors . . . .”)).
152. See id. at 9.
153. Id. at 8–9.
154. React offered to allow EDM artists to perform at concerts and festivals that would otherwise
be in violation of React’s radius clauses if the promoters and owners of these concerts and festivals
entered into a co-promotion agreement with Eagle. Id. In the co-promotion agreements, React waived
an artist’s radius clause in exchange for fifty percent of the profit made at the concert or festival the
artist performed at. Id.
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increased the price and cost of competition among EDM concert venues;155
(2) limited entry of new competitors into the EDM market and limited the
ability of current competitors to expand; and (3) raised concert ticket
prices for consumers as a natural response to increased costs for
promoters.156
Similarly, in Soul’d Out, Soul’d Out Productions alleges that “AEG
is reducing the supply of artists, which increases the costs for other
festivals, limits consumer choice, and reduces artist, promoter, venue, and
agent income.”157 In support, Soul’d Out Productions cites three large
music festivals (Langerado, Monolith, and Sasquatch!) within Coachella’s
geographic and temporal radius clause restrictions that have shut down in
response to decreases in ticket sales and festival attendance.158
Additionally, Soul’d Out Production cites to a 2017 LA Weekly article that
discusses how radius clauses used by the largest music festival decrease
the quality of other music festivals and harm smaller, less well-known
artists that perform at music festivals after agreeing to the radius clauses
in their performance contracts.159 Further, Soul’d Out Productions cited
the published findings of Scott Hiller’s study of the economic effects that
large festival radius clauses have on concert venues located within the
radius clauses’ specific geographical restraints.160
By comparing concert venues located within the geographical radius
specified in the radius clauses of four American music festivals against
concert venues located outside the same geographical radiuses, Hiller’s
study revealed that concert venues located within the geographical
radiuses were 7% to 28% more likely to shut down than concert venues
located outside of the geographical radiuses.161 Because one of the four
music festivals162 included in Hiller’s study was Coachella, Hiller’s study
offers strong support that Coachella’s radius clauses have anticompetitive
effects on concert venue promoters.163 Further, Hiller’s study offers strong
support for the assertion that radius clauses with broad temporal and

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 18.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 19–21 (quoting from Bain, supra note 3).
160. Id. (citing Hiller, supra note 20).
161. Hiller, supra note 20, at 154.
162. The four largest music festivals from Hiller’s study are: Coachella (Indio, CA), Austin City
Limits (Austin, TX), Bonnaroo (Manchester, TN), and Lollapalooza (Chicago, IL). Id. at 155. All four
of the festivals that Hiller studied are controlled by large-scale festival promoters: Live Nation
Entertainment controls Lollapalooza, Austin City Limits, and Bonnaroo; and AEG Live controls
Coachella. See Sisario, supra note 55.
163. Hiller, supra note 20, at 172.
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geographic restrictions have anticompetitive effects on the concert tour
market.
From both SFX and Soul’d Out, it seems possible that large music
festivals that use radius clauses with broad geographic and temporal
restrictions could cause a decrease in the supply of artists available to other
music festival and concert venue promoters. This could cause both a
decrease in the quantity and quality of live music performances available
to consumers and an increase in consumer prices (a natural response to a
decrease in supply). However, similar to defining a relevant market, a
plaintiff must verify such allegations at trial; no doubt this would be a
burdensome undertaking.
Assuming a plaintiff successfully shows that a radius clause used by
a large music festival has an anticompetitive effect in the relevant market,
in addition to showing the other four elements of a prima facie Section 1
case, the rule of reason analysis burden-shifting framework would then
place the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that any anticompetitive
effects of the radius clauses are justified, and thus not unreasonable
restraints.164
3. Promoter Justifications
If a large music festival promoter can show that radius clauses
promote rather than suppress competition, the anticompetitive effects of
the radius clauses will be justified—and therefore not a Section 1
violation.165 Unfortunately in SFX, because the court was deciding a
motion for summary judgment, the court never discussed the viability of
React’s justification for its use of radius clauses.166 However, in its quicklook analysis, the SFX court acknowledges React’s justification: “[T]o
protect attendance at React’s events from being diminished by fans
attending another performance of a featured artist elsewhere near the same
date and location.”167 The court adds that this justification “is not as easily
rejected.”168
In Soul’d Out, AEG justifies its use of radius clauses for its 2018
Coachella music festival169:
While Plaintiff asserts that the clause is “unreasonable,” this
allegation is conclusory, and undercut by Plaintiff’s own allegations,
164. See SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theatre Entm’t, LLC, No. 16-13311, 2017 WL
3616562, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017).
165. Hiller, supra note 20, at 158.
166. See generally SFX, 2017 WL 3616562.
167. Id. at 7.
168. Id.
169. See supra Figure 1.
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which show that the clause affords fair protection to AEG’s interests.
The entire purpose of the radius clause is to protect AEG from
competitors unfairly free-riding on its creative choices in selecting its
artist lineup and its investment in ensuring those artists will come to
the West Coast to play at the Coachella festival. As more festivals
proliferate, maintaining a unique festival lineup is crucial for
Coachella to remain competitive. And, as Plaintiff alleged, promoters
incur substantial costs to compensate artists from all over the world
for their travel and other expenses to perform at festivals. Plaintiff’s
initial Complaint conceded the reasonableness of the radius clause by
explaining that the radius clause prevented Plaintiff from free riding
on AEG’s investment, requiring Plaintiff to “pay more money to
bring artists in who are not already scheduled to be on the West Coast
during Plaintiff’s festival.” Because the Soul’d Out Festival overlaps
with Coachella, Plaintiffs are uniquely situated to profit off of AEG’s
investment in Coachella by saving the costs AEG expended to bring
artists to the West Coast. As the allegations in the Complaint show,
the radius clause is tailored to protect these interests. It is restricted
to performances at festivals or themed events—not all concerts—for
less than five months surrounding the time of Coachella. The clause
only restricts non-festival or themed performances in the counties
immediately surrounding Coachella.170

AEG not only justifies its use of radius clauses,171 it also anticipates
the rule of reason’s burden-shifting framework172 and argues its radius
clauses are appropriately tailored to restrict artists from performing only
at festivals and themed events.173 However, while the radius clauses AEG
used for the 2018 Coachella do not prohibit “all concerts,”174 they do
prohibit artists from advertising, publicizing, or leaking “[a]ny tour dates
in the states of California, Arizona, Washington and Oregon until January
10, 2018 or when festival is announced, whichever is sooner.”175
According to AEG, a concert promoter in Seattle, Washington, is free to
contract an artist for a performance within weeks of the 2018 Coachella,
but that promoter is restricted in their ability to advertise or publicize the
performance—one must ask why a promoter would contract an artist that
they cannot tell their customers about.
In both SFX and Soul’d Out, the justifications for the restraints on
trade that radius clauses create seem credible. As illustrated by the
170. Mot. Dismiss, supra note 93, at 26–27 (citations omitted).
171. I.e., to protect against competitor free-riding.
172. I.e., that Soul’d Out Productions would have an opportunity to argue Coachella’s radius
clauses are more restrictive than necessary to protect its legitimate objectives.
173. See Mot. Dismiss, supra note 93, at 26–27.
174. Id.
175. See supra Figure 1.
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promoters of Woodstock, putting on a large music festival is a risky
endeavor, requiring large, up-front investments.176 If other music festival
and concert promoters in the relevant geographic market were free to take
advantage of an investing music festival’s efforts and, simultaneously,
diminish the investing festival’s customer base, then eventually the
investing music festival would either shut down or lose incentive to invest
in future music festivals.
Once a defendant offers viable justifications for otherwise
anticompetitive effects of the restraint on trade, the rule of reason analysis
shifts one last time to the plaintiff to show that any legitimate objectives
the defendant has for utilizing the restraint on trade can be achieved by
substantially less restrictive means.177 Part IV below offers insight into
how a plaintiff could show substantially less restrictive means by defining
two specific ways that a large music festival promoter’s radius clauses may
restrict more competition than is necessary to protect its legitimate
objectives.
IV. DEFINING UNREASONABLE RADIUS CLAUSES
As large music festivals continue to grow,178 the radius clauses that
they employ will likely continue to intensify, both in their temporal and
geographical restrictions. Therefore, it seems inevitable that a court will
subject radius clauses used by large music festivals to a rule of reason
analysis. When courts review radius clauses, they should find that some
radius clauses used by large music festivals, like the ones used by the 2018
Coachella,179 are overbroad and therefore violate Section 1. Radius clauses
used by large music festivals violate Section 1 when they: (1) prohibit
artist performances beyond the music festival’s geographic market and (2)
do not effectively distinguish between concert performances and festival
performances, which should, in most cases, be distinguished as different
product markets. In both instances, the radius clauses restrict more than is
necessary to protect large music festivals’ legitimate objectives.
First, radius clauses used by large music festivals are unreasonable
restraints on trade when they specify a geographical radius that exceeds
the distance that consumers travel to attend a music festival or concert.
Courts should be critical of a music festival radius clause that arbitrarily
extends far beyond the average distance that a consumer will travel,
because such restrictions cannot be justified by the promoter’s need to
176. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
177. See SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theatre Entm’t, LLC, No. 16-13311, 2017 WL
3616562, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017).
178. See generally supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text.
179. See supra Figure 1.
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protect ticket sales. Indeed, it seems that current music festival radius
clauses specify broad geographic radiuses without careful, data-driven
consideration for the area of effective competition that they need to
protect.
For example, the 2018 Coachella radius clauses specify broad and
far-reaching geographical restrictions that restrict beyond the distance that
consumers are likely to travel. The 2018 Coachella radius clauses state that
artists shall not perform “[o]n any North American Festival” or advertise,
publicize, or leak any festival, themed event, or tour date in California,
Arizona, Washington, and Oregon.180 Coachella, located in Indio,
California, is over 1,200 miles from Seattle, Washington.181 Yet according
to Ticketmaster, a ticket sales and distribution company, the average
festival attendee will travel only 903 miles to attend a large music
festival,182 and the average attendee of a concert will travel only 43
miles.183 Therefore, the 2018 Coachella radius clauses’ prohibitions that
impact artists contracted to perform a concert in Seattle extend beyond the
legitimate objectives for Coachella’s radius clauses. And although
Coachella may feel the need to protect ticket sales from consumers outside
the 903-mile distance the average consumer will travel, the prohibition on
performing “any North American Festival” certainly reaches far beyond
903 miles or any radius of effective competition. Therefore, courts should
be critical of the specific geographical restrictions that large music festival
radius clauses specify, asking whether the geographical restrictions
unjustifiably exceed the geographical distance that consumers are likely to
travel to attend the festival.
Second, radius clauses used by large music festivals unreasonably
restrain trade when they do not effectively distinguish between concert
performances and festival performances, which should, in most cases, be
distinguished as different product markets. Therefore, when a large music
festival radius clause prohibits artists from performing or advertising for a
concert, this restriction should be considered overbroad because it seeks
to restrain trade in a product market that does not compete for its ticket
sales. A relevant product market exists when products have reasonable
interchangeability,184 which involves an analysis of the cross-elasticity of
market demand.185 For example, a consumer shopping for a European
180. See supra Figure 1.
181. Driving Directions from Indio, California to Seattle, Washington, GOOGLE MAPS,
http://maps.google.com (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search starting point field for “Indio,
California” and search destination field for “Seattle, Washington”).
182. Leonhardt, supra note 65.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.
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sports car is unlikely to view an American pick-up truck as a reasonable
substitute. Likewise, in Soul’d Out, Soul’d Out Productions made a
compelling case that concert performances are not a reasonable substitute
for music festivals.186 At bottom, Soul’d Out Productions argues that
although both music festivals and concerts feature live performances from
musical artists, today’s large music festival promoters have created a new
product—the large American music festival—that offers consumers a
distinct experience from a concert performance.187 As such, prohibiting
artists from performing in a different product market, i.e., concert
performances, is outside the scope of a music festival’s relevant product
market (or the market it expects competition from) and therefore should
be deemed an overbroad and unreasonable restraint on trade in violation
of Section 1.
Indeed, Soul’d Out Productions’ argument is rooted in relevant
antitrust law. For example, in International Boxing Club of New York, Inc.
v. United States, the Supreme Court found that “championship boxing
contests” constituted a separate relevant market from “all professional
boxing events,” noting that, while both products share physical identities
likely to place them in the same market, (1) the average revenue that
championship boxing contests generate are significantly greater than other
professional boxing events and (2) those in the business verified that a
special, greater demand existed for viewing championship boxing
contests.188 Similarly, there can be no question that large music festivals
like Coachella generate gross revenues far exceeding even the most
successful concert performance venues.189 Further, as discussed above,
large music festivals additionally attract revenue from corporate sponsors
eager to tap into a captive millennial audience.190 And the demand for large
music festivals is unique from concert performances because customers
are willing to pay more and travel farther to attend large music festivals
than concert performances.191 Moreover, large music festivals sell out
before the artists to perform are announced,192 which strongly supports the
argument that music festival customers demand the festival experience

186. See generally Second Am. Compl., supra note 30.
187. Id.
188. See Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249–52 (1959); see also
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 111–12 (1984) (finding that
broadcasting college football games on television constitutes a separate product market from other
broadcasting and professional football).
189. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
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itself—unlike concert performances, where customers demand
performances from a specific artist.
Additionally, based on the precedent established in International
Boxing Club of New York, potential exists to find separate relevant product
markets amongst music festivals. Large music festivals also generate
revenues and demand that is distinct from smaller music festivals,
justifying a distinction between the two. For example, the 2017 Coachella
grossed $114.6 million, and the 2018 Coachella festival passes cost
between $429 and $999,193 whereas Soul’d Out Music Festival194 has
grossed under $2 million in the festival’s total history and 2017 tickets
ranged from $25 to $95.195
However, in drawing a distinction between concert performances and
music festivals, an exception for headlining artists is likely needed. Large
music festival promoters’ legitimate objectives for using radius clauses
must be considered (i.e., music festival promoters use radius clauses to
protect their large, up-front investments to attract popular artists from
other music festivals and concert promoters that may seek to free-ride and
thus diminish the investing promoters’ customer base).196 For example,
large music festivals contract with “headlining” artists (or widely popular
artists likely to attract huge crowds) to increase the chance of a large or
sold-out crowd that will help guarantee a return on the promoter’s
investment.197 For example, the 2018 Coachella contracted for artist
Beyoncé to headline one of the days of the festival; Beyoncé’s popularity
and performance are so pronounced the 2018 Coachella is commonly
referred to as “Beychella.”198 If a concert promoter were not prohibited
from contracting a headlining artist like Beyoncé, because the radius
clause would be barred from including a prohibition on concert
performances, then that concert promoter may possess the ability to
diminish the large music festival’s customer base for at least one day of
the festival. This example reveals the need to consider music festival
promoters’ legitimate objectives, balancing them against the
anticompetitive effects of radius clauses, creating an exception to the
193. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 2.
194. Ironically, Soul’d Out Music Festival does not consider itself a music festival. Id. at 12
(“[T]he Soul’d Out Music Festival hosts simultaneous hard-ticket concerts across several indoor
venues, and it presents artists from a narrow set of genres. It promotes this concert series as a ‘festival’
in order to co-market the artists and increase awareness.”).
195. Id. at 5.
196. See supra Section III.B.3.
197. See generally Gwee, supra note 3.
198. See Suzy Exposito, From Coachella to #Beychella: Beyonce Schools Festivalgoers in Her
Triumphant Return, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 15, 2018, 5:29 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music
/music-live-reviews/from-coachella-to-beychella-beyonce-schools-festivalgoers-in-her-triumphantreturn-627815/ [https://perma.cc/R9RB-4RK2].
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general proposal that radius clauses should be considered unreasonable
when they fail to distinguish between concert performances and music
festivals: a music festival radius clause may restrict a headlining artist
from performing a concert within a reasonable geographic and temporal
radius.199
Therefore, when radius clauses used by large music festivals: (1)
prohibit artist performances beyond the music festival’s geographic
market and (2) do not effectively distinguish between concert
performances and music festival as different product markets (except in
the case of headlining artists), such radius clauses should be found to be
overbroad and, therefore, an unreasonable restraint on trade in violation of
Section 1.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of Woodstock, today’s music festival promoters have
successfully created a consumer experience for festival-goers distinct from
the traditional concert experience. But creating the large music festival
experience is a difficult task requiring large, up-front investments from
music festival promoters. In order to protect their return on these
investments, music festival promoters use radius clauses. On their face,
these radius clauses restrain trade by prohibiting the artist from performing
or advertising for another music festival or concert for a specified temporal
and geographical radius. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act only
prohibits unreasonable restraints on trade that suppress competition and
the market as a whole. To determine whether a music festival’s radius
clauses are unreasonable, a court will likely subject the radius clauses to
the fact-intensive, burden-shifting rule of reason analysis. Demonstrating
to a court that radius clauses are causing harm to competition and the
market as a whole will be an arduous task for any advocate; however, the
data currently available—as sparse as it is—suggests competition and the
market as a whole are, on balance, harmed by the most restrictive of radius
clauses. Therefore, radius clauses used by music festival promoters that
(1) prohibit artists from performing in a geographical radius beyond the
festival’s relevant geographic market and (2) fail to distinguish between
concert performances and music festivals should be found to be
unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.

199. A further exception to this exception may be required to address large music festivals that
sell out before the artist line-up is announced because those music festivals demonstrate that they have
created a product—the festival itself—that does not rely on specific artist performances to protect their
legitimate objectives.

